Distributed Kerberos5? Fwd: NSA backdoor risks in Kerberos

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Distributed Kerberos5? Fwd: NSA backdoor risks in Kerberos

Wang Shouhua
On 2 April 2014 20:45, Russ Allbery <[hidden email]> wrote:

> Benjamin Kaduk <[hidden email]> writes:
>
>> The core kerberos protocol itself is pretty well-analyzed, and unlikely
>> to have been backdoored.  There could potentially be issues with the
>> crypto primitives used by a particular Kerberos implementation or
>> encryption type (e.g., PRNG, block cipher, and hash function), but such
>> issues would have much broader consequences than just kerberos.  AES is
>> probably fine, but, say, the md4 hash function used in arcfour-hmac's
>> string-to-key is not so good, and as mentioned already RFC 6649
>> deprecates some weak enctypes.
>
> With Kerberos, it's always worth being aware that it's a trusted central
> authentication system.
Isn't there a distributed version of Kerberos5 which avoids this problem?

Wang
--
Wang Shouhua - [hidden email]
中华人民共和国科学技术部 - HTTP://WWW.MOST.GOV.CN


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Re: Distributed Kerberos5? Fwd: NSA backdoor risks in Kerberos

Russ Allbery-2
Wang Shouhua <[hidden email]> writes:
> On 2 April 2014 20:45, Russ Allbery <[hidden email]> wrote:

>> With Kerberos, it's always worth being aware that it's a trusted
>> central authentication system.

> Isn't there a distributed version of Kerberos5 which avoids this
> problem?

Trusted third party is inherent in the Kerberos protocol, and indeed
inherent in Needham-Schroeder.  If it didn't use trusted third party, it
wouldn't be Kerberos, it would be something else.

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Russ Allbery ([hidden email])              <http://www.eyrie.org/~eagle/>
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